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Abstract—An exploit involving the greatest common divisor 
(GCD) of RSA moduli was recently discovered [1]. This paper 
presents a tool that can efﬁciently and completely compare a large 
number of 1024-bit RSA public keys, and identify any keys that 
are susceptible to this weakness. NVIDIA’s graphics processing 
units (GPU) and the CUDA massively-parallel programming 
model are powerful tools that can be used to accelerate this 
tool. Our method using CUDA has a measured performance 
speedup of 27.5 compared to a sequential CPU implementation, 
making it a more practical method to compare large sets of 
keys. A computation for ﬁnding GCDs between 200,000 keys, 
i.e., approximately 20 billion comparisons, was completed in 113 
minutes, the equivalent of approximately 2.9 million 1024-bit 
GCD comparisons per second. 
Keywords-CUDA, RSA, greatest common divisor, parallel com­
putation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
RSA is a public key encryption scheme which relies on 
the difﬁculty of factoring large numbers. The algorithm is 
prevalent throughout security, and speciﬁcally common in 
web-related applications. An RSA public key is comprised of 
a modulus n of speciﬁed length (the product of primes p and 
q), and an exponent e. The length of n is given in terms of 
bits, thus the term “1024-bit RSA key” refers to the number of 
bits which make up this value. The associated private key uses 
the same n, and another value d such that d · e = 1mod φ(n) 
where φ(n) = (p − 1) · (q − 1)[2]. Ideally, given the number 
of possible primes that may be used to construct a 1024-bit 
modulus, no random number generators should reuse either 
prime. Thus, the probability of either p or q being repeated in 
a set of keys should be approximately 0. An individual key 
may be considered secure by itself, but when compared to 
other keys, might exhibit a weakness which allows each key’s 
d to be calculated entirely from public information. 
When considering two keys, a weakness exists when the 
greatest common divisor of both moduli, n1 and n2, is greater 
than 1. If GC D(n1, n2) = p, then p must be a shared prime 
n1 n2factor of n1 and n2. Thus, q1 = and q2 = . Once p and p p 
q are known, d1 and d2 can be directly calculated, yielding 
both private keys. 
This weakness is discussed in [1], which showed a sig­
niﬁcant number of existing RSA keys were susceptible to 
this exploit. The primary goal of our work was to speedup 
the most computationally intensive part of their process by 
implementing the GCD comparisons of RSA 1024-bit keys 
using NVIDIA’s CUDA platform. 
To aid in accomplishing this goal, the work in [3] was 
expanded and adapted to compare all combinations of keys 
in a given set. In comparison to their work, larger sections 
of the overall program were able to be executed in parallel, 
resulting in further speedup. 
II. RELAT ED WORK 
The work documented in [1] served as inspiration for this 
work. Here, Lenstra et al. performed a sanity check of a wide 
array of public RSA keys contained in SSL certiﬁcates and 
SSH host keys. Their discovery that a signiﬁcant fraction of 
these keys (roughly 0.2%) were weak led to our desire to 
parallelize their investigation in order to make it as efﬁcient 
as possible with commodity hardware. 
The CUDA implementation of the binary GCD algorithm 
that was built upon (cf. [3]) is an important example of similar 
work being done. On a fundamental level, our work mirrors 
theirs as we based the core of our algorithm on their work, 
speciﬁcally 1024-bit GCDs were calculated in parallel using 
CUDA. However, we expanded its relevance with modiﬁca­
tions in order to automatically divide and parallelize lists of 
large values to compare. 
Another example of work that makes use of the GPU for 
security applications is solving discrete logarithms as pre­
sented in [4]. A set of large-precision operations (768-bit) was 
necessary for this work, and was thus implemented in CUDA. 
This was similar to our own starting point due to the currently-
limited CUDA support for large-precision numbers. Because 
these large values have numerous applications in computer 
security, the work shown here displays another component 
of computer security where parallelizing work with the large 
values can be highly advantageous. 
Our work is an example of an amalgamation of other related 
works. It functions as a supplement to the other materials 
mentioned here, and provides another example of a computer 
security application that signiﬁcantly beneﬁts from using par­
allelization with commodity Single Instruction, Multiple Data 
(SIMD) multiprocessors. What sets it apart is its use of 1024­
bit RSA keys and the method of parallelization implemented. 
III. OVERVIEW OF CUDA 
CUDA is a platform that provides a set of tools along 
with the ability to write programs that make use of NVIDIA’s 
GPUs (cf. [5]). These massively-parallel hardware devices are 
capable of processing large amounts of data simultaneously, 
allowing signiﬁcant speedups in programs with sections of 
parallelizable code using the SIMD model. The platform 
allows for various arrangements of threads to perform work, 
based on the developer’s decomposition of the problem. Our 
solution to the problem presented in this paper is discussed 
in §VI-B. In general, individual threads are grouped into up-
to 3-dimensional blocks to allow sharing of common memory 
between threads. These blocks can then be organized into a 
2-dimensional grid. 
The GPU breaks the total number of threads into groups 
called warps, which consist of 32 threads that will be executed 
simultaneously on a single streaming multiprocessor (SM). 
The GPU consists of several SMs which are each capable 
of executing a warp. Blocks are scheduled to SMs until all 
allocated threads have been executed. 
There is also a memory hierarchy on the GPU. There are 3 
types of memory that are relevant to this work: global memory 
is the slowest and largest; shared memory is much faster, but 
also signiﬁcantly smaller; and a limited number of registers 
that each SM has access to. Each thread in a block can access 
the same section of shared memory. 
IV. ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION 
A. Binary GCD 
Binary GCD is a well-known algorithm for computing the 
greatest common divisor of two numbers. Instead of relying 
on costly division operations like Euclid’s algorithm, bitwise 
shifts are employed. The implementation presented in this 
paper follows the outline displayed in Algorithm 1. 
ALGORITHM 1: Binary GCD algorithm outline 
2
Input: x and y: two integers.
 
Output: The greatest common divisor of x and y.
 
repeat
 
if x and y are both even then
 
GC D(x, y) = 2  · GC D( x , y );

2
each thread except for Thread 0 grabs a copy of the integer at 
threadID - 1. The variable threadID refers to a value 
between 0 and 31 and corresponds to a thread in a warp. Each 
thread shifts its value once and uses its copy of the adjacent 
integer to determine if a bit has shifted between threads. This 
procedure is outlined in Algorithm 2. 
ALGORITHM 2: Parallel right shift 
Input: x[32] is a 1024-bit integer represented as an array of 32 
ints, threadI D is the 0-31 index of the thread in 
warp. 
if threadI D  = 0  then 
temp ← x[threadI D − 1]; 
else 
temp ← 0; 
end 
x ← x >>  1;
 
x ← x OR (temp << 31);
 
The parallel subtract uses a method called carry skip from 
[3]. First, each thread subtracts its piece and sets the “borrow” 
ﬂag of threadID - 1 if an underﬂow occurred. Next, each 
thread checks if it was borrowed from and if so, decrements 
itself and clears the ﬂag. Then, if another underﬂow occurs, 
the borrow ﬂag at threadID - 1 will be set. This continues 
until all the borrow ﬂags are cleared. An outline can be found 
in Algorithm 3. 
ALGORITHM 3: Parallel subtract using “carry skip” 
Input: x and y: two 1024-bit integers, threadI D is the 0-31 
index of the thread in warp. 
x[threadI D] ← x[threadI D] − y[threadI D]; 
if underﬂow then 
set borrow[threadI D − 1]; 
end 
repeat 
if borrow[threadI D] is set then 
else if x is even and y is odd then x[threadI D] ← x[threadI D] − 1; 
xGC D( ) =  GC D(x, y
2
else if x is odd and y is even then set borrow[threadI D − 1]; 
, y); if underﬂow then 
2
2
yGC D( ) =  GC D(x, y
2
else if x and y are both odd then clear borrow[threadI D]; 
if x ≥ y then end 
GC D(x, y) =  GC D( x−y 
GC D(x, y) =  GC D( y−x 
, x); end 
, y); until all borrow ﬂags are cleared; 
else 
, x); 
end 
end 
The parallel greater-than-or-equal has each thread check if 
its integers are equal. If this is the case, then it sets a position 
until GC D(x, y) =  GC D(0, y) =  y; 
B. Parallel Functions 
To accomplish Algorithm 1 using CUDA, the following 
variable shared by the warp to the minimum of its threadID 
and the current value stored in the position variable. This is 
done atomically to ensure the correct value is stored. Finally, 
all the threads do a greater-than-or-equal comparison with the 
integers speciﬁed by the position variable. This function is 
three functions had to parallelized: shift, subtract, and greater­
than-or-equal. As outlined in [3], each 1024-bit number is 
divided across one warp so that each thread has its own 32-bit 
integer. 
The parallel shift function is straightforward: each thread is 
given an equal-sized piece of the large-precision integer. Then 
outlined in Algorithm 4. 
C. Computational Complexity 
The computational complexity of the binary GCD algorithm 
has been shown by Stein and Valle´e (cf. [6], [7]) to have a 
worst case complexity of O(n2) where n is the number of bits 
 ALGORITHM 4: Parallel greater-than-or-equal-to 
Input: x and y: two 1024-bit integers, threadI D is the 0-31 
index of the thread in warp. 
Output: True  if x ≥ y; else False. 
if x[threadI D] = y[threadI D] then 
pos ← atomicMin(threadI D, pos); 
end
 
return x[pos] ≥ y[pos]
 
Fig. 1. Total percentage of CUDA implementation that is parallel 
in the integer. The worst case is produced when each iteration 
of the algorithm shifts one of its arguments only once. Since 
for this application n is ﬁxed at 1024 bits, the complexity of a 
single GCD calculation can be considered to be constant time 
for the worst case. 
To compare all the keys together, the amount of GCDs that 
must be calculated grows at a rate of k2, where k is the number 
of keys. 
D. Theoretical Speedup 
Maximum speedup is deﬁned as follows: 
1
Max Speedup = (1)
1 − P 
where P is the percentage of the program’s execution that 
can be parallelized. This percentage is a function of the 
number of keys the program needs to process, and is calculated 
in Equation 2. 
t · g
P = (2)
t · g + r · k 
where 
• t = time to process a single GCD 
• g = total number of GCD calculations 
• r = time to read a single key 
• k = total number of keys 
Since g will increase signiﬁcantly more rapidly than k, P 
(based on equation 2) will approach 1 as k approaches inﬁnity. 
This relationship can be observed in Figure 1. 
Fig. 2. Number of comparisons needed vs. total number of keys in set 
V. PRO BLEM DESCRIPTION 
The RSA weakness described above demands that each key 
in a set be compared with each other key to determine if a 
GCD greater than 1 exists for any pair. Given a known set of 
keys, it is not known before processing the keys which will be 
likely to have a GCD greater than 1; therefore, there is no way 
to eliminate comparisons between speciﬁc pairs. The natural 
organization to fulﬁll this requirement is a comparison matrix 
of the all keys. Each location in the matrix corresponds to a 
comparison between two keys. 
VI. IMPLEMENTAT ION 
A. Problem Decomposition 
Initially, the comparison matrix seems to be an n2 solution. 
However, the diagonal of the matrix created consists of unpro­
ductive GCD calculations since these entries would compare 
each key with itself. Furthermore, the matrix is symmetrical 
over the diagonal. Thus, only the comparisons comprising one 
of the triangles needs to be performed. Speciﬁcally, 
k 
Total number of GCD compares = i (3) 
i=1 
This reduction in number of overall compares decreases the 
work performed signiﬁcantly, shown in Figure 2. 
B. Grid Organization 
One of the most important aspects of any CUDA imple­
mentation is the organization of the thread and block array 
to ensure that the architecture is appropriately used to its 
full potential. The thread array in this implementation was 
organized using 3 dimensions. The x dimension represented 
the sectioning of a 1024-bit value into individual 32-bit 
integers, of which there are 32. 
1024 bits per key 
= 32  integers per key 
32 bits per integer 
The remaining dimensions, y and z, were set to 4, resulting 
in a block of 512 threads. This design decision was experi­
mentally determined. See §VI-D for details about Occupancy 
  
optimizations. 
32 · 4 · 4 = 512 
This ensured that each block remained square for algorithmic 
symmetry and simplicity. The y and z dimensions corre­
sponded to how many speciﬁc keys within the list of all keys 
were being compared per block. Thus, two 1024-bit keys were 
loaded into each 32-thread warp, which was then processed 
simultaneously as a single comparison. The x dimension was 
chosen for two reasons: 1) so one thread in this dimension 
would represent each of the 32-bit integers inside the key and 
2) because there are 32 threads in a single warp. Therefore, this 
thread-array organization ensured that compares were done 
using two entire keys (separated into 32 pieces) that were 
scheduled to the same warp. This eliminated warp divergence 
since every warp was ﬁlled and executed with non-overlapping 
data. 
Blocks were arranged in row-major order based on the key 
comparisons that they held. The formula for the number of 
blocks, B, needed for a vector of keys of size k can be seen 
in Equation 4.
 k l4 
i = B (4) 
i=1 
The limit for a grid in a single dimension is 216 −1 = 65535 
which limits the amount of keys that can be processed to 1444. 
To increase the number of blocks available for computation, 
a second grid dimension was added. This increased the theo­
retical maximum number of keys per kernel launch as seen in 
Equation 5.
l k 4   2 
216 − 1i ≤
i=1 (5) 
k ≤ 370716 
C. Shared Memory 
Shared memory was used to load the necessary keys from 
global memory. Two arrays were created in shared memory, 
representing the thread-array; both 3-dimensional, 32 × 4 × 4 
and had an integer loaded into each available space. Each 
array represented which integers would be compared at each 
location in the matrix. A side effect of this organization was 
that each key would be repeated 4 times within its integer 
array. However, this greatly simpliﬁed the GCD algorithm 
so that only a look-up into each array was needed. Since 
shared memory was not the limiting factor for occupancy, it 
was not a priority to optimize this aspect of the design and 
implementation. 
Shared memory was also used within the GCD algorithm, 
speciﬁcally in the greater-than-or-equal-to function, and the 
subtract function. In the greater-than-or-equal-to function, a 
single integer was allocated for each comparison within a 
block. Within the subtract function, shared memory was uti­
lized to represent the borrow value for each integer. 
Threads per block 128 288 512 800 
Occupancy 67% 94% 100% 52% 
TABLE I
 
TABLE GIVING OCCUPANCY FOR VARIOUS BLOCK DIMENSIONS
 
D. Occupancy 
Each SM can be assigned multiple blocks at the same time 
as long as there are enough free registers and shared memory 
available. The ratio of active warps to the maximum number of 
warps supported by a SM is called occupancy. On the Fermi 
architecture, the maximum occupancy is achieved when there 
are 48 active warps running on a SM at one time. Greater 
occupancy gives a SM more opportunities to schedule warps 
in a fashion to hide memory accesses, thus, saturating a SM 
with many warps decreases performance impact. CUDA Fermi 
cards have a total of 32768 registers and 49152 bytes of shared 
memory per SM. The implementation here uses 17 registers 
and 4762 bytes of shared memory per block and therefore 
results in a maximum occupancy of 100%. 
By using the CUDA occupancy calculator provided by 
NVIDIA (cf. [8]), a table can be formed comparing the 
threads per block with occupancy. To maintain the same block 
organization outlined above, the block dimensions can be 
2 × 2, 3 × 3, 4 × 4, 5 × 5 or 128, 228, 512, 800 threads, respec­
tively. Table I shows the calculated occupancy for these block 
sizes. A block size of 512 threads was chosen because it results 
in the greatest occupancy and thus the best performance. 
E. Bit-vector 
The initial approach was to allocate a large, multi­
dimensional array of integers that would hold the results of 
the CUDA GCD calculations. This was allocated to the GPU, 
so each thread could have access as needed; however, since 
the number of results grew at n2, the lack of scalability in 
this approach was quickly apparent. Additionally, performance 
decreased due to the large array that was being sent over the 
PCIe bus. Memory transfers to the GPU are slow, and must 
be minimized. 
After more careful consideration, a new approach was 
implemented. There would only be a single bit allocated per 
key-compare to mark whether or not the pair had a GCD 
greater than 1. In this way, only 2 bytes (16 bits = 1 bit per 
compare) were necessary per block (4 · 4 = 16  compares per 
block), as opposed to the previous 16 · 32 · 4 = 2048 bytes. 
Despite not having access to the answer immediately after 
returning from the kernel calculation, this approach would 
be more efﬁcient since there would be a theoretically small 
number of keys that actually returned with GCDs greater than 
1 (i.e. the ﬂag was set). This small set could then be re­
processed (GCDs calculated) using a different kernel or using 
a CPU algorithm. Efﬁciency would also be increased due to the 
time saved in memory transfers since there was signiﬁcantly 
less memory to transfer before calling the kernel. 
VII. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
A. Test Machine 
All performance measurements were made on a single 
machine with an Intel Xeon W3503 dual-core CPU and 4 
GB of RAM. This machine has one NVIDIA GeForce GTX 
480 GPU with 480 CUDA cores and 1.5 GB of memory. The 
CUDA driver version present on the machine is 4.2.0, release 
302.17, the runtime version is 4.2.9. The CUDA compute 
capability is version 2.0, and the maximum threads per block 
is 1024, with each warp having 32 threads. 
B. Reference Implementations 
In order to check the accuracy of the ﬁnal implementation, 
as well as to provide a point of comparison for benchmarking, 
two reference implementations of this exploit were created. 
Each was able to use the same format key databases (described 
in §VII-C). 
The ﬁrst implementation was written purely in Python 
using the open source PyCrypto cryptography library. This 
implementation was able to perform the entire exploit, from 
ﬁnding weak 1024-bit RSA public keys through generating the 
discovered private keys. This implementation was not used for 
performance comparison as it was dissimilar to the other two 
implementations. 
A sequential version of the binary GCD algorithm was 
implemented to serve as a second validation tool for the CUDA 
implementation. This version sequentially processed the same 
input as both other implementations and produced output 
of the same format. Comparison with this implementation 
ensured that unexpected errors did not result merely from 
processing the data in parallel. 
C. Test Sets 
In order to conduct meaningful tests, it was necessary to use 
an identical data set in all tests. To facilitate this, a tool was 
written in Python to generate both regular and intentionally 
weak RSA key pairs using PyCrypto and store them in an 
SQLite3 database. All keys were generated with a constant e of 
65537, chosen because this was determined to be a commonly 
used value (cf. [1]). 
The generation process produced a database of RSA key 
pairs. Intentionally weak keys were evenly distributed. 
In order to generate a weak key, this program would 
generate an initial normal RSA key but save the prime used 
for p. For each subsequent bad key, p would be replaced with 
this constant, and n was recalculated. The result was that 
each weak key would have a GCD greater than 1 when tested 
against any other weak key. 
Using this tool, it was possible to build arbitrarily large test 
sets with a known number of keys exhibiting the weakness. 
When these databases were processed using any of the ref­
erence implementations, the discovered number of weak keys 
could be directly compared with the number of keys expected 
to be found. This allowed both repeatable testing to measure 
run time, and a method to validate the parallel algorithm was 
indeed ﬁnding GCDs as expected. 
Fig. 3. Speedup of CUDA Implementation to Sequential C++ 
VIII. RESULTS 
The accuracy of the parallel implementation was veriﬁed 
against the sequential implementation by using identical test 
data sets with known weak keys. Since both implementations 
found the same set of compromised keys, it was validated 
that these two implementations were internally consistent. 
Furthermore, both matched the results of the separate Python 
reference implementation: supporting the assertion of accurate 
functionality. The speedup of the CUDA implementation (seen 
in Figure 3) was calculated by comparing its run time with that 
of the sequential implementation. Compare this with Figure 
1: this similarity is evidence of the implementation presented 
here matching with theoretical expectations. 
Figure 3 shows that speedup increases dramatically with 
the number of keys until about 2000 comparisons. At this 
point, the GPU becomes saturated with enough blocks to fully 
occupy all of the SMs. Speedup remains constant at 27.5 for up 
to 200000 keys. We have no data beyond this number of keys 
due to the very long run time of the sequential implementation. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
A large speedup resulted directly from writing a CUDA 
implementation when compared to the sequential implemen­
tation. Many more keys are able to be compared in a given 
amount of time using the CUDA implementation. 
A tool was developed to efﬁciently and completely compare 
a list of 1024-bit RSA public keys, avoiding repetition and 
unnecessary work. This tool allows an increased number of 
keys to be compared in contrast to prior work, in turn allow­
ing overall execution time to decrease due to the increased 
parallelism. 
The tool described in this paper offers signiﬁcant advantages 
over other GCD algorithms in CUDA, and practically applies 
this for comparison of 1024-bit RSA keys in order to test for 
a particular weakness. There also exist several areas where 
the implementation would beneﬁt from further investigation 
and development including application of the GCDs, and 
expansion to iterative kernel calls in order to handle even larger 
sets of keys to compare. 
Number of Keys 20 200 2000 20000 200000 
Sequential Time (sec) 0.13 5.59 550.69 55121.86 185551.91 
CUDA Time (sec) 0.21 0.31 20.21 2005.09 6748.23 
Speedup 0.6 18.0 27.2 27.5 27.5 
TABLE II
 
RUN-TIMES OF S EQ UENTIAL AND CUDA IMPLEMENTAT IONS
 
X. FUTURE WORK	 A feature known as Dynamic Parallelism allows a CUDA 
The primary limiting factor of this implementation is the 
amount of memory available on the GPU. Since all key com­
binations must be computed to expose any potential weakness, 
the kernel was structured to take a single vector of keys and 
perform all possible comparisons. In order to process more 
keys, either a GPU with more memory must be used, or the 
algorithm must be modiﬁed in order to use multiple, iterative 
kernel launches. The iterative kernel approach would require 
memory to be separated into two sections that could each be 
ﬁlled with subsections of the large, complete array of keys. 
All comparisons would then be performed between the two 
subsections by calling the kernel that is currently implemented. 
Upon returning from the kernel, the data in one subsection 
would be shifted, and all the compares would then be done 
for those two sets of keys. This process would continue until 
both vectors have iterated over all keys: speciﬁcally, the kernel 
call would reside in a pair of nested for loops. This change 
would allow the implementation presented here to process an 
arbitrary number of keys. 
To further enhance the above proposed addition, asyn­
chronous memory transfers could also be added to the im­
plementation. When combined with multiple kernel launches, 
a signiﬁcant portion of the memory I/O (which is one of the 
main limiting factors of performance using the GPU) would 
be able to be masked by simultaneously processing the data 
currently on the GPU while new data is being copied onto it. 
An aspect that was originally intended for this project, but 
was not implemented was to have the CUDA kernel return 
the actual GCD of any keys that were found to be “weak” in 
the sense there existed a GCD greater than 1. Since a large 
majority of the GCDs found by our implementation are equal 
to one, memory is wasted if all the results are transferred back 
to the host. The most memory efﬁcient solution would include 
dynamically allocating memory for any signiﬁcant results on 
the device. This would remove the recalculation step in the 
current implementation needed to produce private keys. 
Recently NVIDIA has released information about a new 
GPU architecture called Kepler[9]. The Kepler architecture 
introduces new features that may increase the performance 
of this implementation. 
kernel to launch new kernels from the GPU. This would 
allow dynamic allocation of block sizes for different areas 
of the comparison matrix and remove idle threads from the 
kernel. Hyper-Q is a new technology that manages multiple 
CUDA kernels from multiple CPU threads. With the current 
Fermi architecture, only one CUDA kernel may run on the 
device at one time. This can lead to under utilization of the 
GPU hardware. An approach using multiple CPU threads, 
each running their own CUDA kernel, could greatly increase 
throughput. 
The ﬁnal missing component of this implementation would 
be to complete the algorithm and use the GCDs which are 
being calculated to generate RSA private key pairs. In order 
to do this, a heterogeneous multi-process approach may be 
most straightforward. After the parallel run completes, the bit-
vector of results would be examined to ﬁnd the key pairs which 
produced GCDs greater than one. In these cases, the GCD 
would be recomputed, and used as either p or q. Once this 
was done, the missing prime would be computed, then based 
on this, d would be found. The resulting RSA public/private 
key pair could be exported or stored for later veriﬁcation. 
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